Institutional analysis of food and agriculture policy in the Caribbean : the case of Saint Lucia by Saint Ville, Arlette S. et al.
lable at ScienceDirect
Journal of Rural Studies 51 (2017) 198e210Contents lists avaiJournal of Rural Studies
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/ j rurstudInstitutional analysis of food and agriculture policy in the Caribbean:
The case of Saint Lucia
Arlette S. Saint Ville a, *, Gordon M. Hickey a, Leroy E. Phillip b
a Department of Natural Resource Sciences, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
b Department of Animal Science, McGill University, Montreal, Canadaa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 23 September 2016
Received in revised form
26 January 2017
Accepted 1 March 2017






Collective action* Corresponding author. Room MS3-039, Macdon
Lakeshore Road, Ste. Anne de Bellevue, Quebec H9X 3
E-mail addresses: arlette.saintville@mail.mcgill.c
hickey@mcgill.ca (G.M. Hickey), leroy.phillip@mcgill.c
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.03.004
0743-0167/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elseviera b s t r a c t
The role played by various institutions in the domestic agri-food systems of Caribbean nations has
become an increasingly important area of research and policy attention. This paper assesses the main
policies that have been implemented in Saint Lucia's agri-food system over two time periods (pre-1950
and 1950 to 2010), and analyzes their influence on formal and informal institutions. Results suggest that
rule convergence in export (formal) and domestic (informal) agricultural production systems displaced
informal institutions to a lower position in the institutional hierarchy. This institutional change has
reduced interactions between farming community members, with negative implications for bonding and
bridging social capital in the domestic food production system. Collectively, these changes have resulted
in unintended outcomes associated with the decline of many rural communities. Our findings highlight
the need to better identify bridging institutions in Saint Lucia's domestic agri-food sector that could help
support shared rule-making, the decentralization of power and reciprocal knowledge flows amongst
policy actors.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Historically, the plantation institution, as the basic unit of
colonial agricultural production in the Caribbean, heavily influ-
enced social norms, interactions and relations in the regional agri-
food system (Saint Ville et al., 2015). As a fully integrated institution
that ruled over every facet of life in the region, the plantation was
more than an economic phenomenon. Levitt and Best (1975)
described it as a powerful political, economic and social unit (see
also Beckles and Shepherd, 1996; Richardson, 1992). Despite
sweeping social transformations across the Caribbean, ranging
from emancipation of slavery, universal adult suffrage and political
independence (Beckles and Shepherd, 1996), plantations heavily
influenced the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1991; Saint Ville et al.,
2015) by defining formal rules, informal norms and their enforce-
ment (see Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2007 on linkages between formal
and informal institutions). In recognition of this historical legacy,
noted Caribbean ‘Plantation School’ economists such as Lloyd Best,ald Stewart Building, 21111
V9, Canada.
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Ltd. This is an open access article uNorman Girvan, George Beckford, and Clive Y. Thomas have called
for a re-examination of the agri-food institutions operating in the
region (Elliott and Palmer, 2008; Timms, 2008).
Formal institutions can be defined as the codified laws that
govern governments, cooperatives, firms and communities, and
which are followed by members (Hodgson, 2006), while informal
institutions are understood as socially-defined codes of conduct
that are transmitted through and by the community (Rahman et al.,
2012). Increasing research and policy attention has been placed on
how informal institutions facilitate social processes that can enable
actors to manage and adapt to change, (Folke, 2006; Ostrom, 2009)
interact, communicate, and innovate (Leeuwis and Aarts, 2011).
Here, the concept of social capital, defined as the enduring con-
nections of networks, reciprocity and social norms that exist among
social actors (Narayan, 2002), has increasingly been applied to help
understand social processes that influence information flows, po-
wer relationships and collective action (Adler and Kwon, 2002).
Social capital comprises three dimensions: bonding (horizontal ties
within a subgroup), bridging (horizontal ties bridging distinct
subgroups) and linking social capital (vertical ties to power and
finance developed through shared tasks directed towards the
common good) (Grootaert et al., 2004; Sabatini, 2009). Not all social
capital is considered equal, with these three dimensions playingnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Map of Saint Lucia showing major agricultural areas.
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While previous research has identified strong relationships
between social capital, information flow, and agricultural innova-
tion in smallholder farming systems (see van Rijn et al., 2012;
Dessie et al., 2013; Speranza, 2013; Wossen et al., 2013; Chen
et al., 2014; Reed and Hickey, 2016), relatively little is known
about how institutional dynamics affect interactions between
different dimensions of social capital (Adger, 2003; Pelling and
High, 2005; Kode, 2013). Importantly, while there has been some
empirical work on the various roles that different institutions play
in affecting smallholder agricultural innovation systems in the
context of Sub-Saharan Africa (Darr and Pretzsch, 2008; Timu et al.,
2012; Mashavave et al., 2013), there has been little-to-no empirical
research in the Caribbean, particularly in the context of social
capital and collective action (see, for example, Dessie et al. (2013) in
the context of Ethiopia). Recognizing the need to better understand
these complex relationships in Caribbean smallholder farming
systems, this paper explores how various dimensions of social
capital have evolved and both influenced, and been influenced by,
institutional dynamics in Saint Lucia's domestic agri-food system.
2. Methods
2.1. Data collection
Following a case study research design (Yin, 1994), qualitative
datawere collected using archival, documentary, direct observation
and key-informant interview methods. This strategy allowed us to
describe complex social relationships and reveal the in-
terconnections between actors (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Becker,
1996; Yin, 2002). All field data collection activities were under-
taken between July and October 2013. Key informant interviews
(Becker, 1996) were conducted with 57 respondents (Table 1)
across Saint Lucia, including all major farming communities (Cas-
tries-Roseau/Millet, Babonneau, Dennery, Micoud, Choiseul, Vieux
Fort) on the island (see Fig. 1). Interview respondents were pur-
posively sampled following a snowball strategy using two selection
criteria: 1) they held a position or role in farmer/community
mobilization at the national level (political activists, sociologists,
journalists, environmentalists, anthropologists, trade unionists,
historians, folk researchers, linguists); or 2) they were senior
smallholder farmers who had been producing in the food system
for over 50 years. To ensure that we were able to access a wide a
group of these (often retired) farmers, we sought assistance from
the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Production, Fisheries, Co-
operatives and Rural Development, private sector, NGOs, farmerTable 1
Respondent profile.
Key Informants
Group 1: Smallholder Farmer (65e80 years old)
Location of Farming community
Northern Communities (Babonneau, Bexon)
Southern Communities (Vieux Fort, Micoud)
Western Communities (Choiseul, Millet, Anse la Raye)
Eastern Communities (Dennery)
Sub-total
Group 2: National Specialists
Agriculture (finance, engineering, policy, economics) and Natural resource managem
Historian/Sociologist/Linguist/Anthropologist





Totalgroups, faith-based organizations and community leaders in the
major rural communities to identify and locate prospective farmers
across the island.
Interviews followed a semi-structured format and covered four
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and the collective-action problems related to getting farmers
working together to solve their shared problems; 3) power or in-
formation asymmetries in their interaction that serve to limit
farmers' willingness to work together; and 4) incentives that are
associated with conforming to the different institutions operating
in Saint Lucia's agri-food system. Interviews and follow-up dis-
cussions were conducted in English or the local dialect of Kweyol
with the help of a translator/field assistant as required.
2.2. Data analysis
Interviews were recorded, translated, and transcribed in full for
content analysis (Altheide, 1987; Morgan, 1993). The constant
comparison method (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) was used to
manually code the data usingMaxQDA, with themes and categories
emerging through an iterative and recursive process leading to
patterns being identified. The Institutional Analysis and Develop-
ment (IAD) framework (Ostrom et al., 1994) was then used to
structure our analysis of institutional change in Saint Lucia's agri-
food governance systems. More specifically, we were guided by
the adapted IAD frameworks of Fischer et al. (2007) and Rahman
et al. (2014) when conducting our analysis of institutional change,
focusing on two time periods: pre-1950 (the period preceding the
export banana intensification policy) and 1950 to 2010 (the period
following the export banana intensification policy). These two time
periods were selected to capture the change from sugar production
to contract banana production beginning in 1953 (Grossman,1998),
and cover the decline of banana export markets following trade
liberalization in the late 1990s. In an effort to limit the scope of this
paper, food imports were not addressed in the analysis of focal
action situations for the domestic market. This allowed our analysis
of change to differentiate between informal institutions involved in
the production and marketing of fresh foods for domestic markets,
from the formal institutions involved in production and marketing
of fresh foods for export markets.
We also applied the Program in Institutional Analysis of Social-
Ecological Systems (PIASES) framework (McGinnis and Ostrom,
2010; McGinnis, 2011) to guide our temporal analyses into the
rules operating in export (formal) and domestic (informal) markets
(McGinnis, 2013). PIASES is a dynamic framework that uses the IAD
framework and facilitates an improved understanding of how in-
teractions, flows of information and resources shape decision-
making in a SES. Additionally, our use of PIASES has implications
for future research through the use of common conceptual lan-
guage that intersects with Ostrom et al. (1994) principles of design.
It is important to note that this research was based on an
assumption that the effects of public policies on agrarian change
can be better understood through analyzing institutional devel-
opment, operation and change processes over time. It therefore
adopts a neo-institutionalist perspective, where individuals are
seen as having relatively little impact on public policy, with struc-
ture and design instead affecting policy outcomes (March and
Olsen, 1983; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).
3. Results
In this section we use the first tier variables of the PIASES
(Governance System; Actors; Resource System and Resource Units;
and Interactions/Outcomes) to structure our findings from archival,
documentary and key informant interviews. Using these headings,
we then describe the second tier variables operating, first in the
export (formal), and then domestic (informal) markets. In pre-
senting our findings, we describe variables beginning with the pre-
1950 period (preceding export crop intensification) and then the1950e2010 period (following export crop intensification).
3.1. Description of the focal action situation pre-1950: formal and
informal institutions
3.1.1. Governance system
3.1.1.1. Formal governance system (pre-1950). Findings revealed
social, political and racial divisions permeated formal governance
systems of Saint Lucia in the pre-1950 period. Key informants
described highly authoritative and centralized public policy pro-
cesses, with minimal interaction from the Black citizenry. Carib-
bean writers have described this period as a relic of slavery, with a
plantation agriculture culture in effect that was informed by an
exploitative ethic (see also Richardson, 1992). Previously, as a
Crown Colony, the Colonial Administration vested political power
in the Governor whowas supported by two councils: a six-member
Executive Council (comprising the Governor, Treasurer, Attorney
General, and three other unofficial members selected by the
Governor from the planter class); and a twelve-member Legislative
Council, (comprising the Executive Council and five unofficial
members of the planter class and merchant class). With economic
and political power concentrated in the hands of the minority
‘White planter class’, the formal governance systems in this period
can be characterized as monocentric (Wenger, 2010). Termeer et al.
(2010) defined such a system as onewhere the state, as the national
authority, controls the national agenda and problem-solving takes
place through ‘top-down’ policy definition and implementation. As
the centre of political power in such a governance system, White
formal actors used their state-appointed political power to control
society, resources and the economy. To illustrate, Corthesy and
Harris-Roper (2014) have identified that employment law during
this periodwas designed to “subjugate and control” (p.20) the Black
working class. In the case of Saint Lucia, planters maintained social
and economic divides by instituting vagrancy laws, high land sales
taxes, and licensing fees on transportation to pressure labourers
into continued employment on their estates (Harmsen et al., 2012).
Political power remained in the hands of the White minority
until adult suffrage gave political power over to the citizenry. Po-
litical change began for the Black majority in 1921. At that time,
limited franchise allowed only 1509 people to vote (2.3% of the
population) which maintained the top-down approach with a mi-
nority of social actors shaping public policy. Without democratic
avenues to get their issues heard, exposed to deplorable working
conditions on estates and repressive laws, the Black population
resorted to civil disobedience, including strikes and riots (Harmsen
et al., 2012). As described by George Charles (1994):
As a period (1930s-1940s) of low wages, long hours of work, no
rest on Sundays and public holidays, employment of child la-
bour, little or no health facilities, no vacation leave, no
compensation for industrial injuries and limited educational
facilities and 90% of the people were illiterate and disen-
franchised… these conditions meshed into a powder keg which
exploded in 1937…with strikes, riots and violence (pp. 12e13).
The British Government responded to this social unrest across
the British Caribbean by instituting the Royal West India
Commission (1945) (more popularly known as the Moyne Com-
mission). Their report, released in 1945, made varied recommen-
dations, but it was the legalization of trade unions that initiated the
preliminary transformation of the political system by stimulating
the trade union movement in Saint Lucia, supported by universal
adult suffrage in 1950.
3.1.1.2. Informal governance system (pre-1950). While a small
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reverse situation existed in the informal governance system.
Although there is a dearth of archival records on this governance
system, oral histories shared by key informants described a
plethora of informal institutions that governed rural communities.
These developments followed the departure of ex-slaves from
sugar estates, after the Emancipation of Slavery Act of 1833.
Economically marginalized and politically disenfranchised, our
findings suggest that these rural communities developed in prox-
imity to plantations, but were governed autonomously through
social capital embedded in intra-community networks. These
findings are supported by Louis (1981), in his doctoral thesis on the
development of the Saint Lucian peasantry. He described how
through well-organized community-based interactions (such as
annual cultural Flower Festivals), different communities came
together, competed and developed what he termed “a collective
identity” (p. 110). These community-based groups were not limited
to cultural development, but also undertook infrastructural devel-
opment (such as church building).
In the absence of support from the formal governance system,
Harmsen et al. (2012) noted how these community-based groups
allowed the development of “self-expression, identity-formation
and social-diversification” (p. 187) that supported the develop-
ment of informal institutions. The role of these groups in rule-
making may be explained by the work of Bourdieu (1989), who
highlighted the importance of symbolic capital, used to legitimize
the social world by actors and likely served to validate these newly
developing rules and interactions. Through such social legitimizing
processes, communities self-organized using social capital, partic-
ularly trust and reciprocity. Examples of informal institutions
identified by our key informants included: land sharing, labour
sharing (Helping Hands, Cou-de-main), product sharing, Burial Aid,
and rotating savings groups (Sous-Sous). These institutions were
fostered by horizontal accountability and collaboration and
appeared to integrate community members, through their negoti-
ated involvement in mutually relevant activities. As described by a
retired farmer of Labayee community:
[E]verybody would drop their children at a particular person's
home and they would together weed each other's gardens, by
turns… it was a kind of a spontaneous arrangement where they
created their own support.
Although a potential drawback of this informal governance
systemwas that it promoted and required collaboration based on a
common identity, Wenger (2010) suggests it is generally more
supportive than the monocentric model to collective learning and
adaptation.
3.1.2. Actors
This section presents our findings on the actors that comprised
the focal action situation in the formal (export market), and then
informal (domestic market). This is seen as an important facet of
institutional analysis in order to better assess how various actors
use resources and the nature of their interactions (Fischer et al.,
2007; Rahman et al., 2014; McGinnis and Ostrom, 2012). Our
findings reveal fourmain actors operating in the pre-1950 agri-food
system: planters, agricultural workers/labourers, sharecroppers/
metayers (boundary actors), and subsistence farmers.
3.1.2.1. Formal institutional actors (pre-1950)
3.1.2.1.1. Planters. The White planter class owned large sugar
estates (~100), with each covering hundreds of hectares of fertile
alluvial plain distributed across rural Saint Lucia (Lewis, 1968). For
example, Marquis Estate, located on the northeast coast, coveredover 1032 ha. Planters in Saint Lucia struggled through varied crises
(from natural disasters, slave revolts/labour riots, sugar market
declines and military instability) that resulted in their dwindling
numbers (Harmsen et al., 2012). In addition to owning prime land
resources dedicated to sugarcane production, each planter held
significant financial investments in sugarcane, from production
equipment, processing facilities to shipping arrangements
(Richardson, 1992).
3.1.2.1.2. Agricultural workers/labourers. Our findings indicate
that in the pre-1950 period, these agricultural workers of African
origin continued to play the dominant role as labourers on plan-
tations. The 1946 Census showed that 25% of the population (17,528
persons) were involved in wage labour. An estimated 50% of these
were employed as agricultural workers (25% in the sugar industry,
and 25% in other export crops) and the remaining 50% were
employed in non-agricultural pursuits (GOSL, 1989; Harmsen et al.,
2012). Agricultural workers held no legal contracts but many were
employed and housed over long periods of time (covering gener-
ations) on estates.
3.1.2.1.3. Share-croppers (metayers). Metayers were agricultural
workers who entered into share cropping arrangements (called
metayage in French) with planters. Typically from these contracts,
share-croppers received three acres of estate lands for an agreed
time (usually six years) and shared half of the returns from sugar
sales with planters. In exchange, planters provided them with
additional lands to build a residence, produce food (subsistence),
and raise animals. Through these agreements, planters consoli-
dated their land capital while simultaneously accessing cheap la-
bour from these semi-independent producers, who accessed
virtually free labour from their fellow community members
through their social networks (Adrien,1996). As a result of their risk
taking activities, metayers advanced as entrepreneurs. Ironically,
their economic success was predicated on access to labour (based
on their social capital) from community members, at costs and
productivity levels unavailable to the planter class. As boundary
actors, metayers also operated as informal institutional actors who
served to bridge the informal and formal domains of agri-food
system governance in Saint Lucia. Such bridging interactions
were risky, with metayers often accusing planters of overcharging
(for cutting, hauling and processing of cane) and cheating on
marketing accounts (Adrien, 1996; Harmsen et al., 2012).
3.1.2.2. Informal institutional actors (domestic markets) (pre-1950)
3.1.2.2.1. Subsistence farmers. Key informants described this
single group of actors in the informal system, as relatively homo-
geneous: rural-based, unemployed or under-employed, producing
at subsistence levels for their households and the domestic market
(GOSL, 1989; Harmsen et al., 2012). Cash strapped with limited
resources, cooperation among community members was a pre-
requisite for their survival. Community members worked together,
produced food and additional crops (shelter, medicine, rope, fire-
wood) to support themselves and their households. Their low use
of technology was compensated by high labour inputs (Brierley,
1988), and may help explain why social cooperation guided their
interactions to manage and share needed labour inputs.
3.1.3. Resource systems and resource units
3.1.3.1. Formal resource systems and resource units (pre-1950).
As an agrarian society, export production remained the primary
economic activity in Saint Lucia. Detailed archival records of export
production over this colonial period (such as annual agriculture
reports) describe the export crop quantities produced, processed,
exported and incomes generated. Apart from sugar, other export
crops included: limes, cocoa, coconuts, and bananas. Despite these
emerging export crops, sugarcane production dominated large
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and resources, since the sugar crop took between 12 and 16months
from planting to harvest. Low fertility from longstandingmonocrop
production required fertilizer application of animal manure and
imported nitrogen, typically applied before planting. Annual sugar
production volumes were managed through a sugar export quota,
with processing of cane occurring at four centrally located factories
(Harmsen et al., 2012). Quotas declined over the period due to
competition from cheaper producers. For example, in the period
leading up to 1950, the annual quota was less than 10,000 metric
tons, compared to half a million metric tons in the 1890s (Adrien,
1996).
Sugar market declines (reduced quotas, sugar prices and falling
wages) created economic woes for formal actorswith workers most
disadvantaged. In response, colonial administrators sought substi-
tute export crops, as recommended by the Royal West India Com-
mission Report(1945). Earlier efforts (in 1924) to introduce export
bananas proved unsuccessful due to pest infestation from Whither
tip disease (Colletotrichum gloeosporioides) (Harmsen et al., 2012).
With fertile lowlands covered with sugarcane, available flat lands
were scarce. The search for new lands to grow bananas encouraged
the widespread clearing of forested hillslopes. To illustrate, in one
year, 300 ha of forested slopes were cleared (Harmsen et al., 2012).
In the absence of conservation protocols, massive landslides
resulted, most notably in 1938, when two major landslides killed
100 people, injured 23, and left 700 homeless (Reynolds, 2006).
3.1.3.2. Informal resource systems and resource units (pre-1950).
Key informants described the pre-1950 time period as cash-
strapped, with the majority of rural actors working collabora-
tively to produce crops at subsistence levels. Sale of excess pro-
duction took place at weekly farmer markets that served to bolster
household incomes. These farmersmarkets evolved from slavery, to
facilitate exchanges of fresh foods produced on small plots (provi-
sion grounds) by slaves (Harmsen et al., 2012). Later, their pro-
duction for the domestic market took place on small farms in the
forested hillslopes surrounding rural communities. Volumes were
typically small with diverse crops grown (e.g., food crops, wood for
shelter and firewood, medicinal plants). Actors sold fresh foods of
relatively low economic value, at these weekly markets.
3.1.4. Interactions and outcomes
Our findings support the view that the plantation institution
had a strong influence on the export (formal) and domestic
(informal) agri-food systems in Saint Lucia. In particular, the in-
stitutions governing land rights evolved from two distinct paths
influenced by both the British and French. While British law came
into force when England gained control of Saint Lucia in 1840, the
Napoleonic civil code and French communal land inheritance laws
continued due to the longevity of French2 colonial rule (see
Crichlow, 1994). French communal land inheritance laws gave rise
to communal lands that represented an estimated 45% of all lands.
Informal institutions guided the access and control of these lands.
Known colloquially as ‘family land’ they were managed through
shared working rules: 1) co-owners hold blood-rights but often
lack a deed or other legal evidence of their land rights, 2) bloodline
allows right of access and use of lands, and 3) all co-owners are
permitted to harvest permanent crops planted on the lands. In
contrast, planters held British-influenced private property rights
over large land estates. Table 2 presents these parallel land tenure
systems using Ostrom et al.’s (1994) seven categories of working
rules guiding natural resource management. In the domestic mar-
ket (pre-1950), boundary/entry rules required community resi-
dence/family land access while export markets were guided by
production quotas and plantation ownership. Scope rules directedwhowas authorized tomanage the resource, whichwas the basis of
legal and economic rights. In the sugar export market, these rules
directed private property rights that covered the most fertile lands,
while shared rules oversaw domestic production on communal
lands typically located on marginal hillsides. Information rules
guiding these markets and cropping systems were markedly
different. In the export market, these rules were restricted. They
involved protectionist policies and quotas and depended heavily on
access to external supports (e.g., imported fertilizers, and market
connections).
In contrast, these rules in the domestic market served to coor-
dinate production volumes and the large numbers of people
involved in production. As such, information was guided through
open rules and community social networks. Choice rules in the
domestic market directed actions that community members could
take that supported collaboration and open knowledge exchange.
Payoff-rules, by assigning benefits and incentives, and aggregation
rules that oversaw control, served to regulate behaviours and limit
excess production. For example, labour and land sharing strategies
helped ensure that at the community level everyone received
assistance, based on their participation guided by the neighbour-
reciprocity principle (Ostrom, 2000). These rules ensured that
collaboration served to obtain and encourage greater equity and
accountability.
Operating between these two production systems, metayers
appear to have served as ‘boundary spanners’ between the formal
and informal institutions. In their model of policy responsiveness,
Gauri and Lieberman (2006) defined such a phenomenon as
boundary actors who, through their interaction, play a critical role
on the periphery of formal and informal institutions. These
boundary actors also provide opportunities to shape the setting of
rules that help regulate racial group interaction and manage inter-
group behaviour.
3.2. Description of focal action situations 1950e2010: formal and
informal institutions
Following Rahman et al. (2014), in this section, we present the
second segment of our analysis looking first at the export (formal)
and then domestic (informal) institutions operating in Saint Lucia's
agri-food system from 1950 to 2010.
3.2.1. Governance system
3.2.1.1. Formal governance system (1950e2010). Key informant in-
terviews described how adult suffrage in 1950 initiated the struc-
tural transformation of Saint Lucia's political system. The right to
vote placed political power in the hands of the majority Black
populace and energized union-influenced political parties. In 1951,
Britain approved a new constitution that left the social-political
system unchallenged, increased representation by elected mem-
bers on the two governing councils and reduced the number of
nominated members. With these developments, the British colo-
nial administration sped-up the process of statehood in the region
and the transfer of political power toward self-government
(Harmsen et al., 2012). While these rights and nation-building ac-
tivities (culminating with independence in 1979) held great sym-
bolic meaning for the citizenry, it did not challenge the underlying
monocentric (state-led and directed) governance system. Rather,
the election process became the singular means to engage the
masses into policy processes (through manifestos every five years),
and did not reconcile the low level of citizen engagement in policy
processes.
3.2.1.2. Informal governance system (1950e2010). Key informants
described how self-governing institutions in rural communities
Table 2
Rule inventory showing changes in rules guiding production in the agri-food system revealing rule convergence in the formal (export) and informal (domestic) markets from
pre-1950 to the 1950e2010 period.
Pre 1950 post 1950-2010
Rules under examination Informal Formal Informal Formal
Boundary - number of 
participants, and conditions for 
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policy. Over a short period of time, large numbers of subsistence
farmers exited domestic markets to pursue more lucrative export
markets, leaving behind a small group producing in the domestic
market. While some informal institutions remained associated
with domestic markets, existing social networks became frag-
mented. New social interactions subsequently emerged. For
example, subsistence farmers who were unable to access lands to
become export banana farmers migrated into banana-producing
areas as agricultural workers. As a result, informal governance
systems diminished in influence and coverage. Additionally, as part
of nation-building developments, a local Ministry of Agriculture
was staffed and mandated to manage domestic markets. Vertical
lines of command guided top-down, command and control gover-
nance approaches used by the ministry and statutory agencies
(such as state appointed representatives to direct the Marketing
Board and Development Bank) working through specialist em-
ployees (such as agricultural officers, agronomists, agricultural
economists). With the state now setting the agenda in the domestic
market, these newly created national ministries and agencies set
policy goals, yet operated independently of informal institutions indomestic markets, resulting in a generally poorly-coordinated
policy environment.
3.2.2. Actors
3.2.2.1. Formal institutional actors (1950e2010). We identified
varied actors involved in the implementation of export banana
intensification policy. These actors displayed considerable hetero-
geneity (scale of operation, cultural and economic interests) as they
facilitated the transition from sugar to intensive banana exports.
Each performed specialized roles needed to integrate famers into
global banana export markets based on newly imposed rules. In the
section below, these actors will be discussed in order of decreasing
scale (international, sub-regional, national and household/farm
household level): Geest Industries, Windward Islands Banana
Growers’ Association (WINBAN/WIBDECO), Saint Lucia Banana
Growers Association (SLBGA), and independent banana farmers.
3.2.2.1.1. Geest industries. By creating the guaranteed protected
market for bananas, the British Government initiated the formal
policy of export agriculture intensification. This formalized
arrangement began in 1953 with the contract awarded to the small
British family-firm Geest Industries to buy all Windward Island3
A.S. Saint Ville et al. / Journal of Rural Studies 51 (2017) 198e210204bananas (Grossman, 1992). The company flourished as the export
market developed over time. By 1971, Geest had expanded into a
banana production, shipping and marketing ‘giant’ and owned
4000 ha of sugar estates converted into Windward Island banana
farmland. In 1983, confronted by labor shortages and political un-
rest, the company divested their banana holdings of over 16,000 ha
through sale to ex-laborers (Monrose, 2004). By the late 1990s, the
company completely sold off its interests in the banana industry,
and changed its strategic interest to convenience foods. British
media noted that the sale price for the company was higher than
expected, with Geest registering a profit of £21.5 UK million from
the sale (Stevenson, 1995).
3.2.2.1.2. Windward Islands Banana Growers’ Association (WIN-
BAN)/Windward Islands Banana Development and Exporting Com-
pany (WIBDECO). Initially established to administer crop insurance
to protect the fledgling banana industry from hurricane damage,
Windward Islands Banana Growers' Association (WINBAN) held a
minor role in the supply chain. It was owned by the National Ba-
nana Growers' Associations of Dominica, St Lucia and St Vincent
and the Grenada Banana Cooperative Society. As Geest Industries
banana interests waned, the Windward Island Governments
became the major shareholder of WINBAN. Initially WINBAN's role
expanded to provide administrative, as well as research and
development services. Later with incorporation in 1961, and
commercialization in 1994, it was transformed into the business
entity Windward Islands Banana Development and Exporting
Company Limited (WIBDECO), with a UK Subsidiary, WIBDECO UK.
At this point, WIBDECO became the key intermediary organization
in the supply chain, contracted by Geest Industries to supply ba-
nanas from all national Banana Growers Associations. Two years
later, WIBDECO, in a joint-venture with Fyffes, purchased interests
in the regional banana shipping line of Geest Industries, and five
years later, the marketing arm of Geest Industries. In 2003, WIB-
DECO bought out the Fyffes partnership and assumed full control
(once held by Geest Industries) of supplying, shipping, marketing
and distribution of all Windward Island bananas in Europe. Ironi-
cally, this expansion coincided with growing market uncertainty,
low banana production (34,000 tons, valued at $16 US million) and
declining producer participation (1600 registered farmers in Saint
Lucia) (Reynolds, 2006).
3.2.2.1.3. St Lucia Banana Growers' Association (SLBGA)/Saint
Lucia Banana Corporation (SLBC). SLBGA linked first Geest, then
later WIBDECO with Saint Lucian banana farmers. Formed by the St
Lucia Banana Growers' Association Act No. 6 of 1967, the association
was managed through a government appointed board. Informants
shared how concerns mounted, as the associations' activities
became more complex, and less transparent. As SLBGA operations
ballooned over time, deductions in farmer payments increased. For
example, initially farmers delivered bananas in bunches to the
ports. In 1970, the delivery system changed to shipping in boxes.
These changes required investments in SLBGA facilities and pro-
cesses, with bananaswashed, chemically treated, crated, stored and
transported weekly to ports. Later these ‘boxing’ responsibilities
were transferred to farmers (Reynolds, 2006). By the 1990s,
growing costs of production, market uncertainty from changing
trade regimes, and falling crop prices had stoked farmer dissatis-
faction. Compounding matters was the flood of cheaper Central
American bananas into European markets, as a market penetration
strategy (Reynolds, 2006). Thesemarket uncertainties, and growing
charges of corruption by the SLBGA, galvanized farmers into col-
lective action. In 1996, farmers rioted and refused to harvest banana
crops. Many stopped harvesting bananas voluntarily, but others
were forced to participate by the burning down of their crops
(Reynolds, 2006). The government response to this national crisis
culminated with two farmers being killed as police attempted todisperse demonstrators (Reynolds, 2006). Farmers had the last say
in the general elections of 1997 when the incumbent government
was toppled by 16 seats to 1. As promised in their election mani-
festo, the new government dissolved the embattled SLBGA
(September 1998) as part of efforts to return the association to the
control of farmers (Joseph, 2011). After paying off its $16 US million
debt (Reynolds, 2006), they created a privately-owned company,
the Saint Lucia Banana Corporation (SLBC). This company was
owned by 3000 newly certified farmers who each received one
share (Reynolds, 2006). Other market-based reforms took place,
that segregated banana farmers by size and experience, as addi-
tional companies entered the liberalized market. By 2000, there
were four local privately-owned companies selling fruit to WIB-
DECO from less than 2000 banana farmers (Reynolds, 2006).
3.2.2.1.4. Independent banana farmers. Our key informants
described banana farmers as a mixed group comprising ex-sugar
planters, ex-metayers, ex-workers and ex-subsistence farmers. An
open entry policy allowed almost anyone to become a registered
banana farmer, as long as they had access to lands (that could hold
one hundred banana mats - less than 0.5 ha). Once registered, they
became a member of the St Lucia Banana Growers' Association
(SLBGA). As the national purchaser, the associationwas obligated to
buy all their fruit of export quality. After some initial delays, large
numbers entered banana production (Harmsen et al., 2012). By
1965, Saint Lucia boasted 12,479 registered banana growers
(O'Loughlin, 1968; Welch, 1994). Clear differences (business skills,
social capital use) between members of this group allowed the
better-resourced planters and entrepreneurial metayers to make
better use of membership opportunities (e.g., SLBGA Board repre-
sentation, money and farm management).
3.2.2.2. Formal institutional actors (domestic markets) (1950e2010).
Unlike the highly coordinated and defined stakeholder roles in the
banana export supply chain, one main formal actor guided policies
in the domestic markets. Two other actors played supportive roles,
as guided by the Ministry of Agriculture.
3.2.2.2.1. Saint Lucia Ministry of Agriculture (the ministry).
With statehood, Saint Lucia received increased local control over
internal affairs like agriculture although exports remained of pri-
mary policy importance. Soon the Ministry of Agriculture devel-
oped as a fledgling public service department with local mandates.
Since the institutional arrangement that integrated banana farmers
in global food chains were already well developed, the ministry
held responsibility primarily for domestic market operations. With
the majority of local resources in the agricultural sector (land,
infrastructure and labour) allocated towards export banana pro-
duction, ministry activities played a secondary role in the agri-food
system. In the late 1990s, with the collapse of the protected banana
market through trade liberalization, the importance of the ministry
and domestic food production increased rapidly.
3.2.2.2.2. Saint Lucia Marketing Board (SLMB). In response to
difficulties faced by smallholder farmers in the marketing of food
crops for the domestic market, the Government established the St.
Lucia Marketing Board (SLMB) in the 1960s as a statutory body,
managed through a government-appointed Board. These board
representatives, their policy goals, means and top-down imple-
mentation approaches varied widely, with changes in political
power and authority. SLMB acts as a wholesaler, purchasing fresh
foods from farmers to retail to supermarkets and hotels and to
export. Although SLMB was expected to play a dominant role in
marketing, it struggled to fulfil its mandate. After one decade of
operation, a report by Marhatta et al. (1978), found that it handled
only small volumes of local produce as part of its total production
and sales. This was estimated at 2 percent annually. The report also
described the challenges of marketing fresh food in Saint Lucia,
A.S. Saint Ville et al. / Journal of Rural Studies 51 (2017) 198e210 205many of which remain highly relevant:
[V]ery disorganized … small scale, without well-defined stan-
dards, marketing practices, or facilities … the marketing system
is primitive and inefficient in moving goods… farmers and their
wives still perform a significant portion of marketing functions
themselves (p.21).
3.2.2.2.3. Farmers’ organizations. As part of development activ-
ity in the agricultural sector, farmers' organizations were widely
promoted. Seen as overtly positive, these organizations were ex-
pected to link farmers (input suppliers, exporters, processors and
consumers) along the supply chain to achieve outcomes, but they
have proven challenging to sustain. One such example is the Black
Bay Farmer's Cooperative. Our key informants acknowledged this
cooperative as one of the two most successful farmer groups pro-
ducing fresh foods for the domestic market. The history of this
group records the ongoing external (donor-led) supports required
to sustain its survival. Launched in 1974, it comprised eleven family
farms growing on 25 acres. It faced a myriad of challenges, and
floundered until repeated injections of donor technical, financial
and administrative capital re-catalyzed production. By 1988, it had
mushroomed to the current size of 35 members producing on 51
acres (IICA, 1989). With assistance from OXFAM and other inter-
national donor agencies, the group was formally incorporated as an
agricultural cooperative in 2008. Despite the expected benefits
(economies of scale, reduced transaction costs, and increased po-
wer for collective bargaining), such farmer groups in Saint Lucia
producing for the domestic market have not been able to coordi-
nate their activities. Most of our key informants assessed these
groups as struggling to operate, while providing minimal services
to members.
3.2.2.3. Informal institutional actors (domestic markets)
(1950e2010)
3.2.2.3.1. Smallholder farmers producing for domestic markets.
As contract banana production became more profitable, farmers
exited domestic production leaving a smaller, disaggregated group
to sustain primarily ad hoc production of fresh foods. These
included smallholder farmers (ex-subsistence farmers): whose
lands were located in areas (the leeward side of the island) where
microclimatic conditions were not conducive to banana produc-
tion, whose lands were too small (less than 100 mats), or whowere
unwilling or unable to grow bananas. This phenomenon was noted
across the region, as the growing export sector squeezed remaining
smallholder producers into a smaller niche (Levitt and Best, 1975).
Eventually, with the liberalization of banana markets in the late
1990s, large numbers of banana farmers re-entered domestic pro-
duction (for more information see Saint Ville et al., 2015).
3.2.3. Resource systems and resource units
3.2.3.1. Formal resource systems and resource units (1950e2010).
While a number of institutions worked in tandem, SLBGA facilitated
all national coordinating activities required for banana production.
They performed this role by providing the technical support
needed for high-input monoculture production under the objective
of maximizing yield. Initial reluctance to plant bananas following
the decline of sugar, the associated high risks of monoculture
productionwaned as incomes increased and banana crop insurance
provided benefits following natural disasters (provided by WIN-
BAN/WIBDECO). As the coordinating organization, SLBGA managed
national activities such as disease control (aerial spraying), provi-
sion of technical services through extension officers, providing in-
puts (agrochemicals) on credit, purchasing, making sales to Geest
and returning payments to farmers (less deductions) (Reynolds,2006). Despite their role as an interface with farmers, our key in-
formants described their interactions with the SLBGA as being
fraught with frustration and distrust. A contentious issue was
SLBGA deductions from farmer banana payments that increased
over time.While it is likely that rising costs were due to increases in
administrative and input costs needed to manage pests and coor-
dinate production (Murray and Hoppin, 1992), our key informant
farmers were more likely to suggest it was as a result of corruption.
Large-scale investments by national governments in the industry
did not address growing farmer concerns, and failed to recognize
the importance of farmer trust in maintaining the banana export
industry. In 1995, Geest sold its banana business to a joint venture
of WIBDECO-Fyffes for £147.5 UK million (each party purchased a
50% share) (Reynolds, 2006). However, with the dismantling of
preferential trading arrangements, despite the consolidation efforts
byWIBDECO, our respondents described declining levels of trust in
the industry that triggered declines in farmer participation in the
export market.
3.2.3.2. Informal resource systems and resource units (1950e2010).
Our findings suggest that the small group of homogenous small-
holder farmers producing for the domestic markets operated at
small scales and in an ad-hoc fashion, until trade liberalization in
the late 1990s. In the post-trade liberalization period, smallholders
producing food for the domestic market became increasingly het-
erogeneous as some ex-banana farmers entered domestic markets.
Data from the Agricultural Census (2007) showed that land allo-
cated for temporary crops4 or short term crops (root crops and
vegetables) doubled from 4570 acres in 1996 (8.9% of the total area)
to 6017 acres in 2007 (accounting for 20% of the total area). These
short-term crops were of relatively low economic value, but
compared to bananas, informants reported better returns and
lower production costs. With their entry, and in the absence of
coordination, domestic producers limited their production volumes
to reduce potential losses from gluts, short shelf-life of fresh pro-
duce, and limited availability of processing facilities.
Marketing of fresh foods crops continued at weekly (and bi-
weekly) markets particularly the Castries Market and Vieux Fort
Market. Farmers typically directly sell their produce to local con-
sumers on Friday and Saturday shopping days. These markets
operate with minimal services, storage, grading, sorting, or
weighing requirements. They feature a diverse product range that
is highly variable because of the importance of seasons on rain-fed
farming. Mostly women, vendors typically have small farms, or are
members of farm families with responsibility for the sale of
household produce, or small-scale ‘middle-men’. Municipal coun-
cils are responsible for the farmers markets in the respective city/
town with spaces rented daily, by ticket (average cost $2 USD).
Market facilities have minimum storage area with produce sold in
ambient air temperatures.
3.2.4. Interactions and outcomes
In the 1950e2010 period (see Table 2), state-led policies trans-
formed rules undermining common understanding (community
interactions and collective action) that previously guided domestic
production systems. While all categories of ex-sugar actors in the
post-1950s period entered banana production, it was the loss of the
ex-subsistence farmer group that most affected rule development,
interactions and outcomes in the domestic market. Since the other
actors had played a lesser role in domestic markets, rule develop-
ment post-1950s paralleled the changing relations between ex-
subsistence farmers in their new role as independent smallholder
farmers in the export market.
In the absence of boundary rules to guide domestic production
volumes and protect marginal land use, ex-subsistence producers
Fig. 2. Changes to the dimensions of social capital (SC) in the agri-food system pre-
1950 to 2010 based on interaction levels between actors. Rule convergence in do-
mestic and export markets over the period resulted in reduced intra- and inter com-
munity interactions. We show significant declines in bonding and bridging social
capital in domestic markets, small increases in bonding and bridging social capital in
export markets, alongside significant increases in linking social capital.
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replaced them with banana plants (see Table 2 1950e2010 col-
umns). Post-1950, these changes led to agricultural production on
ill-suited steep slopes with negative environmental consequences
(Cox et al., 2005; Rojas et al., 1988). With changing relations be-
tween ex-subsistence farmers in their new role as independent
smallholder farmers, information sharing rules bolstered by
informal institutions became less relevant and social networks
became more fragmented. New scope and choice rules emerged as
competition, autonomy, and increased output replaced subsistence
production with increased disaggregation of producers. As large
tracts of land became allocated to monoculture bananas, lands
under food production in the domestic market were drastically
reduced. To illustrate, the total area of agricultural holdings pri-
marily allocated to banana production, stood at 35, 000 ha in 1961
and post trade liberalization it declined to 12,000 ha (in 2007), a
66% decrease in export bananas (GOSL, 2007). The diversion of
human and land resources towards export-oriented food produc-
tion reduced domestic fresh food production volumes and the
consistency of their supply, creating a looming food and nutrition
security challenge that was not immediately apparent because of
the increased household incomes from the banana cash crop
economy and easy availability of imported foods (Saint Ville et al.,
2015). Food imports in Saint Lucia have been increasing steadily
and and were estimated at $127 US million in 2012 (GOSL, 2013).
Rule convergence in formal and informal institutions helps
explain the existing resource management challenge in domestic
markets in the post-trade liberalization period. While land acreage
and the actors exited export-banana markets and re-entered fresh
food production for the domestic market, the ‘new’ agreed upon
rules proved inadequate to foster collective action as each entrant
to production in the domestic market decreased the overall welfare
of all producers. Our key informants repeatedly described the
challenges of managing their production as a result of: supply gluts,
high variability in prices, and high rate of food spoilage. Addition-
ally, while the influx of ex-banana farmers to domestic markets did
not change the rudimentary marketing system, it ironically
changed production systems by introducing higher-input agricul-
tural practices, values and norms.
4. Discussion and analysis of change
We can observe two important institutional changes, pre-1950
and from 1950 to 2010, that transformed Saint Lucia's domestic
agri-food system as the ‘rules of the game’ from the plantation or
export markets (formal institutions) replaced resource manage-
ment rules guiding domestic markets (informal institutions). First,
displacement of informal institutions to a lower position in the
institutional hierarchy, driven by rule convergence in export and
domestic markets (see Table 2). Second, reduced interactions
arising from this displacement changed relations between ex-
subsistence farmers in rural communities. These changes appear
to have negatively affected intra-community exchanges (bonding
social capital), and opportunities for inter community horizontal
knowledge flows (bridging social capital), despite apparent in-
creases in linking social capital (see Fig. 2).
4.1. Displacement of informal institutions to a lower position in the
institutional hierarchy, and rule convergence in export and domestic
markets
Institutional change has had significant implications for
resource use in Saint Lucia. For example, pre-1950 boundary rules
of informal institutions for production in domestic markets
required community residence that served to aggregate producersat the community level. With the intensification of banana pro-
duction post-1950, this was replaced with a minimum land access
requirement which allowed anyonewith land greater than 0.5ha to
enter (and later to exit) export production. Since many people have
access to ‘family land’ in Saint Lucia (which represents 45% of lands)
(Crichlow, 1994), this rule change, combined with inadequate co-
ordination mechanisms (needed to foster common understanding
of the rules), led to fragmented and uncoordinated agricultural
production systems.
Growing heterogeneity among community members resulted
from differences in farmers being able to access and benefit from
export production opportunities. Banana farmers contained a
mixed group comprising ex-sugar planters, ex-metayers, ex-
workers and ex-subsistence farmers. These differences in re-
sources, interests and roles weakened cooperation and common
understanding between banana farmers as a group. However, it
was the changing relations between ex-subsistence farmers that
most affected rule development, interactions and outcomes in the
domestic market and community members. Negative feedback
from growing heterogeneity further decreased needed interaction
to develop common understanding among smallholder farmers
(independent banana farmers), which negatively affected their
collective participation in community institutions (such as Helping
Hands). Further, community members with access to family land
were often unable to access credit facilities and were therefore
more dependent on informal community institutions (such as la-
bour sharing) (see De Soto, 2000), which served to widen economic
disparities. As explained by one retired farmer from Micoud:
[Y]ou had a homogeneous society years ago; everybody was on
the same level. So, it's like saying birds of a feather flock
together. We were all the same and we tended to gravitate
together and we did things together … But now, there is more
disparity.
As disparities increased, community members who held title for
their lands and the better resourced entrepreneurial class (such as
ex-metayers) opted out of participating in informal institutions.
Their withdrawal was seen by community members as reneging on
their reciprocity obligations and their unwillingness to interact
socially or otherwise with the smaller, less-resourced farmers.
A.S. Saint Ville et al. / Journal of Rural Studies 51 (2017) 198e210 207Further, as these more business-savy farmers grew and expanded
their production, their need for ongoing interactions with com-
munity members through ‘identity-development activities’ were
further reduced, limiting the effectiveness of traditional commu-
nity sanctions against potential defectors (Schmidt et al., 2001).
Ultimately, as the material benefits associated with export agri-
culture production increased, community-based cooperation was
reported to decrease (see Cardenas and Ostrom, 2004), making
collective rule-making and enforcement difficult.
Our results also reveal how rule convergence in both the do-
mestic and export markets post-1950 resulted in domestic markets
governed by top-down, monocentric governance systems with
state-led control of society, resources and the economy. Such sys-
tems have traditionally been associated with exploitative outcomes
in Saint Lucia and subsequently suffer from reduced farmer trust in
these formal institutions. Initially, social norms maintained racial,
social and economic divisions between the minority European
planter class (French and British) and more populous citizenry of
African origin. Through their role as boundary actors, metayers
initially bridged these structural holes and were able to ‘be the
third who benefits’ (Burt, 1992) despite the planter class monop-
olizing political, legislative, and economic power. Further, a general
lack of recognition of the limitations associated with authoritarian
and top-down approaches in Saint Lucia appears to have resulted in
low importance being placed on informal institutions and com-
munity participation in public policy. This has led to the absence of
formal efforts to acknowledge existing informal institutions and
bridge existing gaps when creating new institutions. As described
by a natural resource management specialist:
[W]e're still back in the colonial sort of perspective … The
tendency has been to use command and control rather than …
participatory and adaptive management approaches.
Low levels of participation by citizens in policy processes have
led to a general perception that formal institutions lack account-
ability and transparency. As such, governance is often narrowly
defined without the needed focus on broader participation and
political inclusiveness. This limited engagement of the populace in
policy development undermines the role of the citizenry in the
democratic process with focus on outcomes (votes), and opens up a
void in the national policy agenda. Further, our interview re-
spondents reported the key roles played by self-interested elites in
the formal institutions that govern Saint Lucia's agri-food system, a
situation that is likely enhanced by declining group identity and
solidarity (Cardenas and Ostrom, 2004). Adult suffrage in the 1950's
gave a voice to the majority Black citizenry through voting, how-
ever, the void in the national policy agenda appears to have been
filled by Black political elites who supplanted the role of the White
planter class. In such a small and isolated population, this division
between democratic processes and inputs has enabled a high de-
gree of access to decision-makers and a political environment that
has been characterized as ‘messianic’ (Joseph, 2011). Further, re-
spondents suggested that because of their interactions with poli-
ticians, farmers are often able to advance their personal interests
rather than those of the collective. As described by a key informant
from the Development Bank:
“It is who you know!” He (the smallholder farmer) understands
the system … and what he is doing now, he is systematically
exploiting that system for his own advantage … he hides or has
all techniques to get him around his commitments.
Such situations suggest that linking social capital is animportant resource being used to influence formal institutions for
individual benefit, undermining their ability to foster collective
action on broader community (public) interests. As noted by a
respondent from civil society:
.… people have difficulty in really determining where their true
loyalties lie. Or where their true interests lie, in terms of what
benefits them the most ….
These observations were aptly described by the 1997e1999
Blom-Cooper Commission of Inquiry as a ‘culture of corruption’
(Blom-Cooper, 1999). In the Commission Report, the author
described how this inertia operated in the civil service of Saint
Lucia:
I have discerned a culture in St Lucia of studied indifference or,
at the very least, inattention to the practice, even the concept, of
public accountability - a cultural climate in which administra-
tive torpor is often the consequence, and malpractices in gov-
ernment (including corruption) can thrive, unhampered by
detection or, if and when uncovered, by disciplinary action …
The suspicion in the public's mind that the machinery of gov-
ernment is not working, and consequently that corruption is
rife, is almost as damaging to the public weal as individual
corruption itself (Blom-Cooper, 1999).
Addressing what can be described as the perverse effect of rent-
seeking behaviour needs to become a priority of the formal in-
stitutions responsible for agri-food policy, in order to better
respond to the complex challenges facing Saint Lucia's domestic
food system. Here, Hinds (2008) suggested six critical areas that can
inform the process of political reform away from the plantation
political legacy: 1) pursuit of democratic outcomes rather than
inputs; 2) evolved substantive democracy beyond post-colonial
forms; 3) mass empowerment and shared nationhood; 4)
rethinking of governance with broader participation and political
inclusion beyond periodic elections; 5) redefined rules, procedures
and elements to include social justice and equality and; 6) expan-
sion of civil rights and liberties to ensure protection against state
oppression.4.2. Reduced interactions negatively affecting bonding and bridging
social capital in domestic markets
Through the described rule changes, an unappreciated outcome
for the domestic agri-food systemwas the negative effects on social
capital (networks, trust, reciprocity, solidarity) by reduced in-
teractions among social actors (see Fig. 2). Rule convergence in
domestic and export markets over the period reduced critical intra-
and inter community interactions, reducing opportunities for
communities to build symbolic capital and forge new institutions.
Findings in other settings have shown that high levels of interac-
tion, particularly at the community level, often serve to reinforce
expectation, values and belief (Minato et al., 2010). In the absence
of these interactions, bonding and bridging social capital in Saint
Lucia's domestic markets appears to have declined. In contrast, in
the export market there were increased interactions, although
limited rule-based interactions (for example annual general
meetings, workshops, etc.), that facilitated minor increases in
bonding and bridging social capital among actors.
With the arrival of new institutions, community cohesion
(based on intra-community interaction) was reported as declining,
with important implications for collective action. As explained by
an ex-banana farmer from a major banana producing community;
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gave the opportunity for those who owned land or had access to
land to transform their circumstances almost dramatically …
the entire outlook changed because these people now started
hiring help.… this community was something like a little New
York. People from … all over, started coming in to this
community.
These changes in intra-community interactions resulted in
changes in identity and de-legitimized existing community in-
stitutions. New rules were in effect that guided the rural commu-
nity as members participated in export agriculture opportunities.
With informal institutional structures facing mass withdrawal of
subsistence farmers, self-organized community-based networks
(based on principles of equity, reciprocity and accountability) broke
downwith reduced interactions among actors guided by new rules.
For example, previously valued bridging social capital and inter-
community interaction became less relevant for agricultural pro-
duction. Banana farmers now received direct support fromworkers,
SLBGA andWINBAN. As a result, neighbours were no longer able to
easily monitor each other's behaviours, and the importance of
reciprocal flow of information for joint-activities declined.
Declining bridging social capital in the informal institutions
appears to have occurred as intra-community interaction reduced
quickly over time. Rapid social change in these communities was
reported as undermining the self-organizing institutions that had
been functioning in communities through social capital, resulting
in institutions based more on competition and rising distrust as
social inequality and distances between community members
increased. Bonding social capital also appears to have decreased
and became consolidated around restricted social networks based
on kinship bolstered by interactions around the use of communal
lands. Interestingly, as social capital dimensions of bridging and
bonding decreased in the domestic production system, linking so-
cial capital appears to have increased. Despite these increases over
time, the political power associated with universal adult suffrage
appeared to not operate as expected (suggesting limited effective-
ness of linking social capital) to solve collective action problems in
Saint Lucia's agri-food system.4.3. Policy implications
Better understanding of the effect of public policy/institutions
on outcomes for agrarian change in the agri-food system has im-
plications for policymakers, donors and farmer associations. In the
case of Saint Lucia, the institutions and common understandings
needed to support sustainable resource use in the agri-food system
is lacking. The dominant policy focus has been on technological and
market conditions, with little consideration of how existing insti-
tutional arrangements respond to the need for re-defining formal
rules, and social norms away from the plantation legacies (Saint
Ville et al., 2017). Ballet et al. (2007) highlights the importance of
‘soft skills’ rather than technological development in natural
resource management by looking at the interplay between linking
social capital, cultural and symbolic capital observed in our find-
ings. They describe the need for cultural and structural social cap-
ital to be converted into symbolic capital in order to reduce
tensions, transaction costs and enhance community-based natural
resource management activities. While cultural and social capital
allowed resource users to bargain over shared values and rules
respectively, it is this process of shared understanding and identity
formation that creates symbolic capital. Bourdieu’s (1985, 1989)
work on symbolic capital used to legitimize rule development in
new groups, and Louis’ (1981) observations in Saint Lucia on theimportance of identity in creating shared rules appear to support
these observations. This suggests that current efforts in
community-based natural resource management to build struc-
tural social capital by looking at connections between resource
users may be insufficient on its own (Saint Ville et al., 2016).
Ultimately, those representing linking social capital (policy-
makers, donors and farmer associations) may benefit from building
horizontal linkages between social actors in the ongoing efforts to
resolve coordination challenges in the food system. Watts and
Wandesforde-Smith (2006) describe such initiatives as operating
‘under the radar’ of formal politics in the Caribbean, but still de-
pends heavily on community-coalitions. Based on past Caribbean
successes, they recommend interventions that use existing
bridging social capital and good linking social capital to build ‘triple
alliances’ comprising informal, multi-level, multi-scalar, pro-
sustainability and pro-participation coalitions. While this
approach has already been applied in other natural resource sectors
in the region (notably in fisheries, coastal zone and watershed
management) (Tompkins and Adger, 2004) it has not been sys-
tematically applied to domestic agri-food systems governance. In
doing so, we note a caution by Woolcock (1998) that we should
recognize dimensions of social capital as “resources to be opti-
mized, not maximized” (p. 158).
5. Conclusion
This study applied a combined PIASES Institutional Analysis and
Development and SocialeEcological Systems (SES) framework to
investigate how institutions have influenced outcomes in the agri-
food system of Saint Lucia. First, displacement of informal in-
stitutions and guiding rules to a lower position in the institutional
hierarchy resulted in the convergence of rules from export and
domestic production systems. Second, these changes fostered
reduced interaction, loss of cultural and identity-building activities
within and across communities, and a general loss of horizontal
linkages between different communities (bridging social capital).
Monocentric governance systems inherited from the plantation
system, supported by rules that created conditions of low
accountability, appear to have weakened the effectiveness of ver-
tical links between different actors in Saint Lucia's agri-food system
(linking social capital) to solve collective problems. Collectively
these changes transformed domestic agri-food systems, resulting in
unintended outcomes such as increasing food and nutrition inse-
curity, low bridging social capital, and low system diversity.
Going forward, there appears to be a need for public policy to
more explicitly and carefully account for the complex institutional
legacies and characteristics which continue to affect the sustainable
governance of Saint Lucia's agri-food system. Our results suggest
the need to better identify bridging institutions in the agriculture
sector, perhaps based on an adaptive co-management model, that
could support shared rule-making, power and knowledge-sharing
amongst policy actors from multiple levels in the governance
hierarchy.
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